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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the Master of Laws (LL.M.) in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International 
Hellenic University. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to familiarize academics and 
professionals involved in the fields of law and economy, with the competition law 
issues, which may emerge from the creation of Joint Ventures in the common market. 
These alliances constitute successful business decisions, for they are an innovative and 
effective way to manage risk in uncertain markets, promote knowledge exchange and 
finally, share the possibly major cost of capital investments. However, it can be argued 
that, they involve a sacrifice of independence and flexibility, when compared to 
separate business ventures1 and the competition issues that they raise can be of 
utmost importance. Although the European Commission (EC), as well as the national 
courts, have attempted to develop this policy area, there are still some aspects that 
raise multiple questions of application. 
 
This work aspires to provide an overview of the framework for assessment of two 
distinctive types of JVs under EU Competition law, mostly at the stage of their 
formation. More specifically, this paper firstly defines the notion of Joint Ventures and 
presents their economic significance in the market. In addition, a distinction is made 
between cooperative and concentrative Joint Ventures, which are treated in a 
different way by the European Commission. Furthermore, we focus on concentrative 
JVs, which can have pivotal effects on competition. Finally, the way the European 
Union has reacted to these effects is carefully examined and the last chapter is 
devoted to “spillover effects”, for they are considered to have a great impact on 
competition and still constitute a major challenge for the European Commission. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, 10 Competition L. Int’l 5, p. 5. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation deals with the evergreen topic of Joint Ventures in the field of free 
competition law within the European Economic Area (EEA). Joint ventures, as business, 
commercial or industrial2 arrangements, project themselves with persistence into both 
business and legal world. The business community regards JVs as one of the most 
challenging disciplines of competition law, to comprehend and follow.3 This 
problematic will possibly augment, because of the fact that JVs tend to take divergent 
forms and they include not only the sharing of bricks and facilities, but also the 
exchange of ideas and mutual commitments.  
 
In fact, JVs might probably be characterized as “chameleons”,4 because they can take 
different forms with divergent features. In particular, they may be of a temporary or 
permanent nature, ranging from a loose ad hoc association, created for the 
accomplishment of a single purpose, to the formation of a long-lasting business 
establishment, which involves capital investment of unlimited duration. Common 
grounds of all undertakings which decide to collaborate through the sharing of both 
human and real assets, is the coordination of multiple, autonomous players in the 
market, with view to achieving a certain economic result. 
 
Whether in the form of loose strategic alliances or formally structured JVs, the 
economic prospects and pro-competitive potential of such collaborations are 
enormous; they allow the establishment of functional elements and economies that 
would not be possible otherwise; only through larger capital and talent aggregations, 
such as in the case of mergers. Therefore, they give small market players the 
opportunity to compete effectively against bigger ones. Unlike mergers, competitors 
                                                 
2 Guillaume Rougier-Brierre (2005) “Joint Ventures processes coming up to speed”, 24 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 
86, p. 1. 
3 Bruce d. Sokler, Yee Wah Chin and Kathryn e. Walsh (2004-2005) “A consideration of Dagher and the 
antitrust standard for joint ventures”, NYU journal of law and business Vol. 1:307, p. 307. 
4 Peter A. Donovan (1973-1974) “Joint Ventures”, 43 Antitrust L.J., p. 563. 
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who decide to create a JV remain competitors in all other business activities. 
Consequently, a combination of cooperation and competition is observed. We could 
compare competitors’ collaboration with the face of Janus; due to the fact that the 
alliance mixes these two elements, it carries within itself the potential of both pro-
competitive benefits and anti-competitive dangers.5  
 
Given the fact that these creations have massive potential to achieve efficiency gains 
and become more and more relevant in the competition field, it is absolutely 
necessary that both the European Authorities and the Member States pay the essential 
attention to this matter and adopt or update enforcement guidelines for horizontal 
agreements in general and JVs in particular.6 In addition, long research and very careful 
analysis by scholars would produce an adequate conclusion that many important 
points still await judicial clarification.7  
 
In the interest of time, this paper will focus mainly on the permanent JVs, which have 
their own autonomous structure and function in the market (the so-called 
concentrative JVs). It is true that, the popularity of this kind of joint ventures has 
considerably increased the recent years, due to major innovation costs and hard 
competition among undertakings in the market. Due to the fact that these enterprises 
work constantly on a common business and economic result, but at the same time 
they remain completely autonomous, there is an issue arising, whether there is 
competition or collaboration between them.  
 
Although competition and cooperation are complementary rather than opposing 
concepts, the exact relationship between them is difficult to define.8 Consequently, it is 
obvious that, the European Competition law has to take into account that JVs have 
                                                 
5 Richard J. Hoskins (2002) “ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF JOINT VENTURES AND COMPETITOR 
COLLABORATIONS: A PRIMER FOR THE CORPORATE LAWYER”, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 119, pp. 119-
120. 
6 “COMPETITION ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES”, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement 
Economiques Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, DAFFE/CLP (2000)33. 
7 Henry W. Nichols (1950) “Joint Ventures”, 36 Va. L. Rev., p. 425. 
8 Paul J. De Rosa (1993) “Cooperative Joint Ventures in European Community Competition Law”, 41 Buff. 
L. Rev. 993, p. 1002. 
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multiple advantages and benefits for the single market, as long as of course that there 
is no distortion or even worse, elimination of competition. 
   
4 
 
I. THE DEFINITION OF JOINT VENTURES 
 
The international notion of “Joint Venture” constitutes one of the most challenging 
issues in the field of competition law.  The EC9 defined JVs as undertakings jointly 
“controlled by several other undertakings, the parent companies.”10 Besides, the term 
“undertaking” is defined by the Merger Regulation11 as an economic unit with an 
autonomous power of decision, which benefits from all essential resources, including 
finance, personnel, production facilities, possibly a distribution network, as well as 
intellectual property licenses.12 The manner its capital is held and the rules of 
administrative supervision, which apply, are entirely irrelevant. It is obvious that the 
term is broad enough on purpose, in order to include any pool of resources, with view 
to operating economic activities,13 irrespective of its legal nature or even the way it is 
financed.14  
 
The term is indeed very wide, does not lead to safe deductions and includes several 
forms of cooperation among multiple undertakings, from a loose ad hoc association, 
created for the accomplishment of a single purpose, to the formation of a long-
lasting15 business establishment, which involves capital investment of unlimited 
duration. Joint Ventures basically combine the valuable market power and assets of 
different undertakings, forming a coordination structure, in order to pursue a certain 
                                                 
9 Tao Xiong and James Kirkbride (1998) “The European control of joint ventures: an historic opportunity 
or a mere continuation of existing practice?” European Law Review, p. 1. 
10 Commission Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under Council 
Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 
1990 O.J. (C203) 10, 10 [hereinafter Commission Notice on Control of Concentrations]. 
11 EUMR, Recital 12th of the Preamble. 
12 Laurent Nouvel (2002) “The New European Treatment of Joint Ventures: A shift towards a more 
economic approach”, 2002 Int'l Bus. L.J. 511, p. 518.  
13 Korah (1998) “An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice”, 6th Ed (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1997). See also EC, Commission Notice on the Concept of Undertakings Concerned, O.J, C 
66/14. 
14 Case C-41/90, Hofner and Elser, [1991] ECR 1-1979; Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet and 
Pistre, [1993] ECR 1-637- 
15 The Commission considers a five-year period as sufficient to have a lasting structural creation. 
Commission Notice on the Concept of Full-Function Joint Ventures, O.J.1998, § 15, EC, Commission 
Decision of 7 October 1996, British Gas Trading Ltd/Group 4 Utility Services, Case IV/M.791, O.J.1996, C 
374/8, § 10. 
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result. This coordination among businesses and through the creation of JVs, is more 
organized than a totally occasional agreement, but lacks the consolidation element, 
which exists in M&A.16 Furthermore, JVs allow companies to market and produce on a 
global basis, which is a unique advantage,17 as well as allocate the costs18 and risks of 
businesses,19 while expanding the already existing resources, in order to create 
business interests.  
 
This extremely wide definition of the term has generated many problems as far as 
competition law is concerned. As a result, much discussion has been conducted about 
whether JVs ought to be treated as a collusive practice or as a structural issue.20 
Probably JVs should be interpreted in a more restrictive way, so as to limit them as a 
phenomenon and finally detect and resolve the arising matters. In fact, the most 
transparent circumstance of the formation of a Joint Venture, is when two or more 
independent undertakings create a third undertaking, which is subjected to the mutual 
control of its parents, with view to achieving the economic result that is destined for. 
In addition, alliances and JVs create value by creating synergies, offering organizational 
flexibility, overcoming economic obstacles and finally, reducing costs.21   
 
This dissertation, after making clear the distinction among several different kinds of 
JVs, focuses on the basic JV, which is defined and regulated by the EUMR 139/2004 in 
Article 3 par. 4 and constitutes a particular and separate kind of concentration, with 
unique results in the field of competition law. Therefore, Joint Ventures will be defined 
                                                 
16 Regarding Joint Ventures and their status between an occasional coordination and an entire 
integration among undertakings, see OECD, “Competition and Cooperation in Innovation, OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook 2002, page 131; Tyson N. (2007) “Joint Venture Regulation under 
European Competition Laws: An Update”, ELJ, Vol.13, No. 3, p. 408; Chen Z., Ross T.W. (2003) 
“Cooperating upstream while competing downstream: a theory of input joint ventures, IJIO, p. 382; Van 
der Bergh, Camesasca, page 205 where Joint Venture is considered to be a kind of hybrid.  
17 Leslie Nelson (1990) “International Joint Ventures”, 2 Int'l Legal Persp., p. 75. 
18 To suggest that the primary motivation for JVs is to raise the necessary capital absolutely signifies a 
problem in the capital markets, see R Amit, and M Tombak, “The Role of Government in Fostering 
Knowledge-based Companies: The British Columbia Experience”, Technology-based Entrepreneurship, D 
Balkin 
19 William M. Landes (1983) “Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers and Joint Ventures”, 52 Antitrust 
L.J. 625, p. 630. 
20 Craig P., De Burca G. (1991) “EU law: Text, Cases and Materials, Fifth Edition, 2011, p. 1050; Hawk B, 
“Joint Ventures under EEC law, FILJ, Volume 1, Issue 2, Article 3, pp. 303-304. 
21 Olubunmi Faleye, Tiantian Gu and Anand Venkateswaran, “Merger Spillovers in Collaborative 
Partnerships”, August 2015, available at SSRN.com, p. 2. 
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as participating undertakings, which agree either by contract or by combining, other 
than by merger, significant productive (tangible or intangible) assets, and by going 
beyond ad hoc co-operation. Most importantly, they agree to perform a business 
function, rather than simply proceeding to make a business decision in common. In 
this regard, many issues arise regarding the relationship that exists among the 
autonomous and separate parent economic entities. This relationship exactly has to be 
analyzed under the scope of competition law.22  
 
                                                 
22 “COMPETITION ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES”, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement 
Economiques Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 33. 
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II. JOINT VENTURES AS A BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC PHENOMENON 
 
Joint Ventures are unique economic creations, most challenging indeed, compared to 
the traditional legal entities of commercial law, mainly due to the fact that the 
cooperation among actual or potential competitors is naturally opposed to the main 
goal of stability and certainty in the single market and of having many autonomous and 
competitive separate economic entities.23 However, nowadays it is established that 
Joint Ventures are no more seen and treated as suspicious creations, wishing to 
threaten economic stability. On the contrary, the effects of the JVs are sometimes so 
beneficial to consumers and to free competition, that their pure existence is absolutely 
to the very best economic interests of the European Union.24  
 
The Joint Venture’s activity may involve the production, trade or the supply of 
products and services, the research and development and generally may be 
encountered in every level of production process. The whole idea and concept of such 
an agreement is found in the coordination of significant real or human resources, in 
order to achieve the common economic goal under better equipped conditions with 
greater results, than would be the case, if every undertaking was to pursue it by itself. 
Due to the fact that businesses share the risk of a new venture and use their common 
resources,25 it is far easier for an undertaking to enter the market or engage to new 
economic activities.26 In this regard, the efficiency gains achieved by JVs are potentially 
much greater than those achieved by the individual activity of undertakings separately. 
Although there are multiple anti-competitive issues emerging from such cooperative 
activities, it is highly possible that competition and coordination do not constitute 
opposing notions; for instance, this occurs in the case of a research and development 
cooperation, when thanks to this cooperation, new markets are created and eventually 
                                                 
23 Tyson N. (2007) “Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update”, ELJ, Vol.13, 
No. 3, p. 408. 
24 Hewitt I. (2005) “Joint Ventures”, Third Edition, p.343. 
25 OECD, “Competition and Cooperation in Innovation, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
2002, page 129, 146. 
26 Prescott D., Swartz S. (ed.) (2010) “Joint Ventures in the international arena”, Second Edition, p. 3. 
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the number of competitors in the relevant markets is appreciably increased.27 It is 
worth mentioning that Joint Ventures are mostly popular in dynamic sectors, such as 
information technology,28 but can also be encountered in multiple traditional sectors, 
such as natural gas, mining and food distribution. What is more, JVs constitute an 
important player in local markets and they facilitate foreign direct investment, notably 
when such investments would not be legally allowed, without the assistance of local 
partners.  
 
However, the efficiencies29 gained by JVs necessitate an ad hoc economic analysis of 
them,30 according to the theory of a “more economic approach”.31 In particular, JVs 
may contribute to the promotion of competition through divergent ways; mainly 
through the better allocation of production means (allocative efficiency) and the 
reduction of production costs (productive efficiency). With the promotion of a more 
statical efficiency and through innovative efficiency, small and medium-sized 
businesses are capable of competing the bigger ones, through the so-called “pooling of 
resources”. Through the creation of a Joint Venture, the coordinating businesses have 
the possibility to pursue economic activities, which would be probably impossible to 
achieve otherwise, due to considerable costs or know-how shortage. This way, 
business risks attached to new ventures are also shared among undertakings.  
 
Consequently, the creation of Joint Ventures does not only assist businesses in battling 
the extreme costs of conducting certain economic activities, but also promotes the 
improvement of quality in new different relevant markets (both product and 
                                                 
27 OECD, “Competition and Cooperation in Innovation, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
2002, page 149. 
28 Kadir Ba (2015) “The Substantive Appraisal of Joint Ventures under the EU Merger Control Regime”, 
European Competition Law Review, p. 1. 
29 Zampa G.L., “The Role of Efficiency under the EU Merger Regulation”, EBOR, 2003, pp. 573 and 610, 
regarding the treatment of efficiencies in European law; Vogelaar F., “Modernization of EC Competition 
Law, Economy and Horizontal Cooperation between Undertakings, Intereconomics, Jan/Feb 2002, p. 19 
and pp. 26-27 concerning economic progress. 
30 Tyson N. (2007) “Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update”, ELJ, Vol.13, 
No. 3, p. 409. 
31 Regarding the ultimate reason to adopt an economic approach in competition policy, see Calciano F. 
(2009) European Competition Policy; Design, Implementation and Political Support, p. 75 and following. 
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geographical),32 since research, development and innovation are encouraged, thanks 
to the coordinating action of undertakings.33 For this reason, the European 
Commission has treated JVs in a positive way and tends to encourage them, especially 
in cases of high technological innovation.34 
 
                                                 
32 Soufleros (2004) “Joint Venture under Corporate and Free Competition Law”, pp. 865-866. 
33 E. Mastromanolis (2013) “Free Competition Law”, p. 351. 
34 Hawk B (1991) “Joint Ventures under EEC law, FILJ, Volume 1, Issue 2, Article 3, p. 338. 
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III. JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE SCOPE OF FREE COMPETITION LAW 
 
Due to the fact that JVs have been interpreted over the years quite broadly as business 
creations that cover not only contractual joint ventures, but also equity joint 
ventures35, which are autonomous economic entities, the treatment of JVs under the 
EU Competition Law is inevitably complicated too. Besides, the hybrid nature of Joint 
Ventures, which include both cooperative and concentrative elements, explains the 
reason they cannot be easily classified. As Jean-Pierre Brill once successfully stated, JVs 
are indeed both cooperative and concentrative in nature at the same time.36 However, 
urged from the necessity to narrow down this extremely interesting term, we have to 
distinguish as much as possible the two basic types of JVs; the cooperative and the 
concentrative JVs.37 The multiplicity of legal texts that exist reflects the difficulty of 
distinguishing and dealing effectively with the dichotomy of JVs. Therefore, it is 
preferable to analyze the provisions that currently govern the evaluation of JVs under 
European Competition law.38 The applicable provisions to Joint Ventures are a) Article 
101 par.1 and 3 TFEU and b) the Regulation 139/2004 for concentrations. Whilst Article 
101 TFEU focuses its interest on the collusive practices between two at least 
undertakings, the Regulation is more interested in the structural part of the 
transaction. The result of this legislative complication is the lack of one and only 
definition for JVs and the challenge of applying the one or the other provision.  
A. COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES 
 
The cooperative JVs are basically agreements among undertakings, assessed under 
Article 101 TFEU. In fact, they are agreements among horizontal (actual or even 
                                                 
35 Hewitt I. (2005) “Joint Ventures”, Third Edition, pp. 68, 89 etc. 
36 J. P. Brill (1980) "La filiale commune et la commission de la concurrence", D. Chron. 283-292, at 283 
("la filiale commune est à la fois concertation et concentration."). 
37 Hawk B (1991) “Joint Ventures under EEC law, FILJ, Volume 1, Issue 2, Article 3, p.303 etc.; and 
comments after the legislative modifications, see Hewitt I. “Joint Ventures”, Third Edition, 2005, p.344. 
38 Laurent Nouvel (2002) “The New European Treatment of Joint Ventures: A shift towards a more 
economic approach”, Int'l Bus. L.J. 511 2002, p. 513. 
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potential)39 competitors, who collaborate in order to achieve together, with the 
combination of their means, a specific economic activity. They can be involved in 
several business activities, from the production to the trade of products and services. 
One example of this kind of JVs are the so-called contractual JVs.40 Actually, in this case 
there is not a new economic entity, but instead the undertakings form an alliance41, so 
as to accomplish their established goal, which would be much harder to achieve by one 
undertaking itself. As for their objective, this can be an alliance for the common 
production or promotion of the parties’ products, or an alliance concerning the 
allocation of productive ability (quite frequent in airlines and generally in 
transportations), or even an agreement to exchange technical information and plans of 
common research and development.42  
 
The characteristics of this particular type of Joint Venture do not exclude ipso facto the 
structural element. Beside the afore-mentioned loose contractual alliances, there also 
exist the so-called equity Joint Ventures, which are new economic entities created by 
the parties to an agreement. Nevertheless, these entities are not autonomous, but on 
the contrary, they are destined to have a supportive function to the parent 
undertakings.43 In this case, we have partial-function JVs, which are indeed separate 
entities from their parents, but cannot be considered to be functionally autonomous 
undertakings.  
 
Cooperative JVs are regulated by the European legislation; in particular, Article 101 
TFEU and the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements44 govern this 
                                                 
39 COMP/JV.23-Telefonica/Portugal Telecom/Medi Telecom (1999) par. 27, concerning the 
telecommunication market. The two parent undertakings had already agreed on and notified to the 
Commission their agreement and cooperation plan, signing at the same time mutual commitments. Due 
to the previous anti-competitive regime that the two parents had agreed on, their possible coordination 
would not lead, as a causal link, to the future creation of the JV. 
40 Soufleros (2004) “Joint Venture under Corporate and Free Competition Law”, p. 865. 
41 For instance, see case COMP/38.284/D2 (2004) Air France/Alitalia. 
42 Chen Z., Ross T.W. (2003) “Cooperating upstream while competing downstream: a theory of input 
joint ventures”, IJIO, pp. 381-382. 
43 Karidis G. (2004) “European Business and Competition Law”, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, pp. 258, 260.  
44 EE C 11 of 14.1.2011, p. 1. 
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type of JVs. The Communication from the Commission mentions45 that, these 
Guidelines ought to be applied in almost every type of horizontal co-operation 
agreements (between competitors), regardless of the level of their concentration, 
except those agreements that constitute concentrations, satisfying the criteria of the 
139/2004 Regulation. Finally, it must be stated that the Communication itself 
acknowledges the difficulties arising from the different legal regimes applying to full-
function JVs and partial-function JVs.46 
 
Furthermore, in order to apply Article 101 TFEU, the cooperative JV must have the 
potential to affect trade among Member States and to restrict competition in an 
appreciable level. In this regard, the Commission Notice-Guidelines on the effect on 
trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty47 and the De Minimis 
Notice4849 are relevant. According to the De Minimis Notice, there are certain minimum 
quantitative thresholds and agreements, which are considered to be of minor 
importance.50 The EC “De Minimis Notice” establishes a haven, where JVs between 
parents, whose shares of relevant markets do not exceed particular thresholds, are not 
investigated by the European Commission. In fact, the European Commission recently 
consulted on a proposal to modify the de Minimis Notice, in order to reflect the EC's 
reading of the recent Expedia judgment (case C-226/11 Expedia Inc v Autoriti de la 
concurrence and Others 20131 OJ C 38/6 [2012], due to the fact that it states that, the 
concept of a non-appreciable impact on competition does not apply when the 
agreement under discussion includes a 'by object restriction' (which, on account of its 
severity, is considered to be per se anti-competitive). 
 
                                                 
45 Par. 6 of 2011 Communication. 
46 Par. 21 of 2011 Communication. 
47 Official Journal C 101 of 27.4.2004 
48 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition 
under Article 101(1) of the TFEU (De Minimis Notice), OJ 22.12.2001, C368/13 
49 “An agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 101 when it has only an insignificant effect on 
the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of 
the product in question” (5/69, Volk v Vervaecke). 
50 Horizontal agreements: when aggregate market share of the parties is below 10% and Vertical 
agreements: when market share held by each of the parties is below 15%. In case we have mixed 
horizontal and vertical agreements: market share below 10% and agreements that have a cumulative 
effect: market share below 5%. Agreements that by their nature restrict competition are considered to 
always have an appreciable effect on competition (per se restrictions). 
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B. CONCENTRATIVE JOINT VENTURES 
 
The EUMR applies to any concentration that has, or otherwise is deemed to have, an 
“EU dimension”. Concentrations may refer to mergers, acquisitions of control or the 
creation of full-function joint ventures. The EU dimension is a prerequisite that is only 
fulfilled, when certain thresholds are met.  
 
The European Merger Regulation applies to transactions, which have the element of a 
concentration,51 with the necessary condition that the relevant thresholds are 
reached. Concentration means that “control of the whole or parts of an undertaking is 
acquired by one or more other undertakings on a lasting basis”52. In the case of a Joint 
Venture, the Regulation is to apply when two or more parties acquire joint control of 
an undertaking. What is more, when we have the formation of a brand-new Joint 
Venture, the Merger Regulation applies, only if the JV performs all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity (autonomy of means and functions)53 on a lasting basis 
(full functionality criterion).  
 
The afore-mentioned criterion does not distinguish between JVs, which are created as 
a “greenfield operation” and JVs, which are formed through the combination of assets, 
that the parties have contributed and previously owned individually. It is to be 
mentioned that, this kind of JVs, which are characterized by this full-functionality 
element, play a most important role in the common market, therefore they had to be 
regulated by the EUMR.54  
 
 
                                                 
51 Christian Bergqvist (2003) “The concept of an autonomous economic entity”, European Competition 
Law Review, p. 1.  
52 EUMR, Art. (1)(b). 
53 Autonomy of strategic decision is not mentioned in the 1998 Notice. Some isolated decisions required 
that the JV could independently determine its competitive behavior and its strategy. The Pasteur-
Meneux decision adopted this approach, stating that the JV limited to the production and sale of 
vaccines was not independent, since its parents had the possibility to decide on strategic R&D planning. 
However, this condition was inconsistent with the joint control criterion (EC, Commission Decision of 5 
July 1993, Pasteur Merieux-Merck, Case IV/ M.285, O.J.1993, C188). 
54 EUMR, Recital 20. 
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i) The Element of Joint Control 
 
Joint control is a very demanding element to be established. Theoretically, joint control 
exists, where two or even more undertakings exercise their influence/control over 
another undertaking55. This can possibly include veto rights, which certainly determine 
the strategic behavior of an enterprise, mostly as far as the adoption of the budget or 
business plan is concerned, the appointment or removal of directors and senior 
management, or certain investments.56  
 
a) Evidence of joint control 
VETO RIGHTS57 
First of all, joint control exists when there are two parent companies, which possess 
equal voting rights in the JV, or alternatively have the right to appoint an equal number 
of members to the decision-making bodies of the JV. However, JVs usually have more 
complicated structures. Indeed, joint control might exist, even where there is no 
equality between the two parent companies or even when there are more than two 
parent companies. It is possible that the minority shareholders have rights that let 
them deny decisions, which can be necessary for the strategic business behavior of the 
JV.58  
 
Although these observations may seem quite clear and also the Consolidated 
Jurisdictional Notice can provide useful guidance on their interpretation, their 
application is not always easy. For example, with view to giving rise to joint control, the 
veto rights at issue must go beyond normal minority protection provisions related to 
decisions on the essence of the JV, such as increase or decrease in capital. Certainly, 
the distinction between strategic veto rights and minority protection provisions is not 
                                                 
55Although the possibility of exercising decisive influence is sufficient, it is not essential to strongly 
indicate that decisive influence is or will be actually exercised, provided that there is an actual possibility 
to do so. 
56 The Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice mentions that it is not necessary to have all veto rights in order 
to be a jointly controlling parent. It is absolutely possible for a single veto right to confer joint control, 
depending on the precise content of the right and the significance that it has in the context of the 
specific business of the target.  
57 Adrian Brown, “Distinguishing between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures: is it getting any 
easier?” European Competition Law Review, 1996, p. 3.  
58 Case T-2/93 Société Anonyme a Participation Ouvrière Compagnie Nationale Air France v Commission  
[1994] ECR 11-323; case IV/M.010 Conagra/Idea [1991]. 
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always evident and the European Commission enjoys an element of discretion on how 
to assess veto rights in multiple cases.59  
 
b) De facto joint control60 
De facto joint control signifies that, although there may be not a single undertaking 
alone that has the ability to veto important decisions, there may be two or more 
minority shareholders, who act together and finally manage to veto such decisions. 
This can be achieved either by agreeing to legally binding agreements or otherwise, by 
consenting not to vote against each other.61  
 
c) Option rights 
The EC has also found that the potential of one party exercising an option could 
determine whether this party has control for EUMR purposes, taking into account that 
the other parties of the JV have interest in the management and the business 
orientation of the JV, as far as the option-holder’s rights are concerned. 
 
d) Changes in the quality of control 
In the case of Joint Ventures, there may be modifications in their structure that could 
possibly lead to concentrations. For instance, when a change from sole to joint control 
or even when a modification of the companies previously exercising joint control takes 
                                                 
59 For example, in the case of veto rights over major investments, the analysis depends on the level of 
investments necessitating approval of both parties and the extent to which investments of the relevant 
magnitude constitute an essential feature of the target's market (i.e., are part of the ordinary course of 
business). Where the level of investments necessitating approval of both parties is high, a veto right may 
constitute a normal minority protection right. If investments do not play a significant role in the JV's 
business, the significance of the veto will be reduced (Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, para 71).  
60 Anshuman Sakle (May-June 2008) “A study of Joint Ventures under Competition laws in Selected 
Jurisdictions”, Competition Commission of India, p. 13. 
61 The Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice also states (para. 79) that: 'In general, a common interest as 
financial investors (or creditors) of a company in a return on investment does not constitute a 
commonality of interests leading to the exercise of de facto joint control.' See, for example, case 
IV/M.548 Nokia Corporation SP Tyres UK Ltd [1995], where the parties claimed that joint control was 
established by the strong common interests that they had while not exercising their voting rights to 
each other. The factors raised showed the existence of common interests were the prior long-term 
coordination between the parties and their common belief that the success of the JV relied on the 
synergy formed by using together their competitive strengths. The EC decided that the existence of 
common interests between the parties was not itself a sufficient ground for the finding of joint control. 
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place, then these changes might possibly amount to notifiable concentrations.62  
 
e) Passive acquisition of control 
An acquisition of control does not always take place on purpose. It is possible that this 
happens in a passive way, through actions of third parties. For instance, the acquisition 
of control may be the result of the inheritance of a shareholder or the result of the exit 
of a shareholder.  
 
ii) The Element of Full Functionality 
 
The element of full functionality entails the principle that a concentration emerges and 
the EUMR is to apply, when the particular transaction has as a result a permanent 
change in the market. Therefore, a Joint Venture, in order to amount to a 
concentration, should operate in a market whilst performing all the basic functions, 
which are carried out by undertakings acting in the same market. The JV must have an 
active management in order to cope with the daily obligations of the undertaking, 
access the essential resources, such as assets, staff and certainly finance, so as to 
operate properly and autonomously in the market, and finally, to have the aspiration 
to operate on a lasting basis. On the contrary, when the JV deals with one particular 
function of its parent companies’ business activities, without direct access to the 
market or without acting autonomously, then it is deemed not to operate in an 
independent way, therefore it will not be regarded as “full function”.63  
                                                 
62 Where instead the number of jointly controlling shareholders is reduced in the JV, without leading to 
a modification from joint to sole control, the transaction will normally not lead to a notifiable 
concentration – Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, para. 90 
63 In considering the degree to which a JV is economically attached to the parent undertakings, the EC 
prefers a pragmatic approach and considers that, in their start-up phase, JVs are often unstable 
creations that may need support in integrating in new or emerging markets. Thus, the EC recognizes 
that, in the initial phase of its life, the JV may need to depend almost entirely on sales to or purchases 
from its parent companies. Such dependence will not have an influence on its full-function status, for as 
long as it does not take place beyond the start-up phase, which as a rule of thumb should generally not 
exceed three years (Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, para 97), depending on the particular conditions 
of the market. Also, the JV might possibly continue to sell to its parents after the initial period, for as 
long as, regardless of these sales, the JV is supposed to play an active role on the market and can be 
considered economically independent from an operational point of view (Consolidated jurisdictional 
Notice, para 98). The relative proportion of sales made to its parents seen with the total production of 
the JV, and whether such sales are at arms' length will be crucial considerations. The same 
considerations will apply so as to evaluate the full-function status of outsourcing arrangements, where 
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Joint Ventures, which have the element of full-functionality but lack the condition of 
EU dimension, might be subject to national merger control rules. In this case, the 
European Commission leaves the assessment of any cooperative aspects to the 
jurisdiction of Member States. The EC has mentioned that, regarding full function JVs, 
which do not reach the jurisdictional thresholds, articles 101 and 102 TFEU may be 
applicable, when a prohibition decision would rely on a restriction of competition, 
resulting from the coordination of parent companies outside the JV (“spillover effect”). 
The EC guarantees that it would let Member States cope with this situation.64 
 
Furthermore, acquisitions of minority shareholdings, which do not have decisive 
influence and fall outside the scope of EUMR, might still lead to co-ownership of 
companies evaluated under the national merger control rules of Member States having 
another test for control, mostly Austria (shareholding of more than 25 per cent 
acquired), Germany (any acquisition providing the possibility to have an important 
influence over decision-making and market) and the UK (any acquisition having 
influence over policy of business). 
 
It is to be stated that the merger control rules both in UK and Germany cover a much 
broader set of transactions than at European level. However, in the UK notification is 
voluntary and also in Germany and Austria, notifications demand limited resources. 
Furthermore, on 5 December 2013 the German Federal Cartel Office published draft 
guidance on how to apply the 'domestic effects' test under the German merger rules. 
This is aimed at assisting undertakings to evaluate their transactions and detect 
whether the transactions have effects in Germany and consequently, whether there is 
an obligation of notification. The Office has mentioned that this initiative’s goal is to 
facilitate concentrations that do not affect Germany and avoid bureaucracy.65  
 
                                                                                                                                               
an undertaking forms a JV with a service provider, which will carry out functions that were previously 
dealt with by the undertaking. (Consolidated jurisdictional Notice, para 100). 
64 See Merger Control Law in the European Union - Situation in March 1998, Statements for the Council 
Minutes on Regulation 1310/97, 67. 
65 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, Allen & Overy, Brussels, 10 Competition L. Int'l 5 2014, p. 11. 
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iii) The Element of EU Dimension 
 
Should it be certified that the JV is indeed a concentration, it is absolutely essential to 
examine whether or not there is an “EU dimension”. More specifically, the Commission 
ought to see whether the turnovers of the undertakings concerned in the transaction 
reach one of the alternative thresholds, which are described in the EUMR.66 In the 
particular case of JVs, the relevant undertakings to be thoroughly investigated, so as to 
apply the jurisdictional thresholds, are those, whose parties exercise joint control over 
the JV.67 Therefore, the element of control is significant, so as to determine whether a 
concentration exists, as well as to discover which undertakings’ revenues ought to be 
considered for the assessment of the jurisdictional thresholds. It is absolutely not 
necessary to take into account every shareholder’s turnover. Furthermore, when joint 
control over a pre-existing business is acquired, then this business will also be 
examined. Finally, whenever a change in the quality of control takes place, the relevant 
undertakings are the new shareholders that exercise the control, as well as the JV.  
 
When a particular transaction does not reach the specific thresholds, it cannot benefit 
from the certain provisions set out in the EUMR. In particular, it cannot notify the 
transaction to the European authorities, but on the contrary has to make the 
assessment in one or more States.68 As far as the EU thresholds are concerned, their 
first set aspires to exclude mergers between small or medium-sized companies and 
small acquisitions by big companies, as well as acquisitions with non-significant 
European dimension. The second set is destined to cover those concentrations, which 
                                                 
66 The EUMR applies if either: (a) The 'original thresholds' are met: (i) the combined worldwide turnover 
of the undertakings concerned exceeds 65bn; and (ii) the EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the 
undertakings concerned exceeds 6250m; and (iii) it is not the case that each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member 
State; or (b) The 'supplemental thresholds' are met: (i) the combined worldwide turnover of the 
undertakings concerned exceeds 62.5bn; and (ii) the combined turnover of the undertakings concerned 
in each of at least three Member States of the EU exceeds E100m; and (iii) in each of at least three of 
the Member States identified in (b) (ii) above, each of at least two of the undertakings concerned has 
turnover exceeding E25m; and (iv) the EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned exceeds E100m; and (v) it is not the case that each of the undertakings concerned achieves 
more than two-thirds of its EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
67 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, Allen & Overy, Brussels, 10 Competition L. Int'l 5 2014, p. 13. 
68 EUMR, Recital 8; “The European Commission has exclusive competence over concentrations with EU 
dimension (the 'one-stop- shop' principle) and Member State authorities may not apply national merger 
control rules to such operations.” 
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do not have an EU dimension under the first set of thresholds, but could have a severe 
effect in at least three Member States, and would actually require notification under 
national competition law of these Member States. These thresholds were introduced 
through an amendment to the EUMR, with view to adding even more transactions to 
its scope and therefore benefit from the “one-stop-shop” principle.  
 
On the other hand, the “two-thirds rule” intends to exclude the transactions, where 
each of the relevant undertakings achieves more than two-thirds of its EU-wide 
turnover in one Member State, from the European Commission’s competency. What is 
more, a system of referrals exists, which offers the possibility to reallocate cases 
between the EC and the Member States upon request and under certain conditions.69 
 
One most interesting observation that ought to be mentioned and explained, is that, 
due to the fact that EU jurisdictional thresholds concern only turnovers and there is no 
interest for undertakings’ effects in the single/common market, it is possible that 
situations are included, where all parents are non-European and the JV has no 
activities in Europe.70 Such situations ought to be taken into account and probably be 
notified, despite the fact that they can be candidates for treatment under the 
simplified procedure. This procedure, in the case of JVs, must be followed, when a JV 
has no actual activities within the European economic area.71  
                                                 
69 See Commission Notice on Case Referral in respect of concentrations [2005] OJ C 56/2. See, for 
example, case COMP/M.6321 Buitenfood/AD Van Geloven Holding/JV [2012];case COMP/M.6525 
SESA/DISA/SAE/JV [2012]. 
70 IV/JV.4-ORANGE/VIAG (1998), par. 30. IV/JV.9-Telia/Sonera/Motorola/UAB Omnitel (1998), par. 29. 
71 On 5 December 2013, the EC adopted a number of measures, in order to facilitate procedures for 
reviewing concentrations under the EU Merger Regulation. With effect from 1 January 2014, a 
notification of a JV may be in order when (i) the JV's EEA turnover and/or the EEA turnover of the 
contributed activities is less than E 100m (depending on the most recent audited accounts); and (ii) the 
total value of the EEA assets transferred to the JV is less than 6100m. Where the assets transferred 
produce turnover at the time of notification, then neither the value of the assets nor that of the annual 
turnover may exceed E100m - Commission Notice of 5 December 2013 on a simplified procedure for 
treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2013] OJ L 336, 1-36, 
para 5(a). In addition, see the case of the acquisition of joint control, simplified notification possibilities 
where the transaction has no or very limited impact on the single market. However, the EC retains a 
wide discretion to revert from the simplified procedure to the normal assessment procedure in a 
number of situations, including for JVs, which, whilst they meet the turnover threshold, are expected to 
generate a turnover significantly in excess of 6100m in the following three years. The 'simplification 
package' further introduces a 'super-simplified notification' for JVs that are active entirely outside the 
EEA. In such cases, companies only need to present their economic activities, and provide the turnover 
elements, which are essential to establish that the EU dimension thresholds are indeed met. 
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATIVE JVs TO FREE COMPETITION 
 
A. SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION (ARTICLE 2 PAR.3 
EUMR) 
 
In order to detect possible anti-competitive consequences from the creation of a 
concentrative JV, the Commission assesses whether there is a possibility to impede 
effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position (SIEC test).72 As a significant change to the previous regime, the old 
substantive merger test, which relied on the creation of dominance, was eventually 
replaced by a significant impediment to effective competition (“SIEC”) test.73 
Furthermore, guidelines on the examination both of horizontal mergers74 and non-
horizontal mergers75 were adopted in 2004 and 2008, respectively. The actual test for 
determining whether a concentration is compatible with the internal market is in 
Article 2(1) - (3) of Regulation 139/2004, which should be read in parallel with Article 
2(4).  
 
It must be noted that the purpose of the competition law is to increase productive 
efficiency. Competition is most important to consumer welfare through this purpose. 
Without competition rules, products and services will not be produced or offered 
efficiently, which signifies that economic and social resources will be absorbed in the 
undertakings, leaving almost nothing to fulfil other social needs. As a result, consumers 
will not benefit from lower prices and better quality. However, with free competition, 
efficiency and consumer welfare are certainly benefited.76  
 
                                                 
72 Article 2 par.3 of Regulation 139/2004. 
73 Gerwin Van Gerven, Melissa Gotlieb (2015) “Data Gathering and Analysis: The Anatomy of a Merger 
Investigation in Europe”, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 39, Issue 1, Article 1 
74 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. C 31/5 
75 Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control 
of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. C 265/6 
76 Richard J. Hoskins, “Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Competitor Collaborations: A Primer for 
The Corporate Lawyer”, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 119 2002, p. 120. 
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Apart from the SIEC test, the Commission ought to evaluate the possibility, whether 
the creation of a JV as a concentration will cause non-coordinated or unilateral 
effects.77 These effects are caused in case there is a reduction in the number of 
competitors in the relevant market, owing to the concentration. The concentrative JV 
may raise the prices, regardless of the other competitors’ reaction. As a result, the rest 
of the undertakings, not being involved in the concentration, will probably raise their 
prices too.78 This is due to the fact that there must be several players in the market, so 
as to have effective competition. In this case, the products/services offered to the 
consumers will have better quality, and competitive undertakings will probably have a 
greater motivation to improve their effectiveness.  
 
On the other hand, coordinated effects signify the existence of some sort of 
coordination with other undertakings. In particular, we investigate the relationship and 
the collaboration that emerges between the JV and its competitors. In order to have 
such coordination, there must be a common purpose and common elements, such as 
similar market shares, activity in the same relevant product and geographical market 
and so on.79 
 
B. COORDINATION OF THE COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF UNDERTAKINGS 
(ARTICLE 2 PAR.4 EUMR) 
 
After the assessment of the afore-mentioned elements, the Commission investigates 
whether there is a possibility to have coordination between the parties of the JV.80 The 
reason of this investigation is that, JVs are complicated creations, as they include the 
agreement between parent undertakings. The parent undertakings, which are 
                                                 
77 Ritter L., Braun D., “European Competition Law: A practitioner’s guide”, 3rd Edition, 2004, p. 569.   
78 Tzouganatos D., « Oligopoly and joint dominant position under free competition law”, 2004, pp.110-
111. 
79 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), par. 40-60. 
80 In case 294/IV/2006 ANTENNA TV A.E.-GRUNER+JAHR AG & CO KG, the Hellenic Competition 
Commission focused on the competitive structure of the market and on the existence of strong 
competitors, in order to decide that there is not a possibility of coordination between the parent 
undertakings. A particular element that was taken into consideration was the fact that the companies 
provided to the Competition Commission separate, absolutely confidential documents, which were not 
to be revealed to the other party of the concentration.  
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completely functionally and structurally autonomous, may easily facilitate the 
coordination of their activities, through their constant cooperation, whilst trying to 
accomplish their commercial goal through the JV. The element that has to be closely 
observed is that, there might be coordination in the concentration itself, among the 
parties that have agreed on the creation of the JV.81  
 
Consequently, the non-coordinated and the coordinated effects that already have 
been mentioned are evaluated in the same way, as in all kinds of concentrations. In 
fact, from the creation of a JV, there may exist a single dominant position (when 
market shares of all parties to the JV are assessed) or joint dominant position (when 
we have the parties to the JV and third competitors). However, the most interesting 
part is the coordination of the parent undertakings taking part in the concentration and 
the fact that, at the same time they preserve their independence. Due to the fact that 
they collaborate so as to achieve their particular purpose, there is the possibility that 
they also expand their collaboration in other fields too. This phenomenon is known as 
“spillover effects or cooperative effects”. The analysis of this phenomenon will be 
extensively presented in the next chapter.  
 
C. THE REAL EFFECT OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES 
 
Anti-competitive effects could also emerge in cases when parent undertakings and JVs 
operate at the same level of production or distribution chain (horizontal agreements 
between competitors), therefore it is highly possible that they coordinate their activity 
and probably restrict competition between them. Classic examples of horizontal 
agreements restricting competition are a) price fixing, which basically destroys 
competition and b) market sharing: territorial allocation of the market, restriction of 
production and customer allocation.  
 
                                                 
81 For instance, see case C-179/12 P, where the European Court of Justice dismissed the appeal brought 
against the judgment of the General Court in Dow Chemical Co v European Commission (T-77/08) by 
which the General Court upheld Commission Decision C (2007) 5910 final, where the Commission fined 
the applicant for participating in a single and continuing agreement and/or concerted practice in the 
chloroprene rubber sector. As a parent company, Dow could was regarded to be liable and was also 
fined by the Commission for the competition infringements of its 50/50 joint venture. 
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However, there might be vertical agreements between parent undertakings and JVs, 
that need to be examined carefully, so as to see if they are valid and compatible with 
European Competition law. Vertical agreements are agreements entered into between 
undertakings, each of which operates at a different level of production or distribution 
chain. Prominent examples of vertical agreements82 are a) territorial restrictions 
(restriction on exports-restriction of parallel trade, restriction on passive sales), b) 
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM)83 and c) customer allocation. For instance, these 
effects are highly possible to appear when we have restrictions for third undertakings 
that operate in the same level as the parent undertakings and they need the JV as a 
supplier or distributor.84 Finally, the creation of several JVs between the same parent 
undertakings may have the so-called “network effects”,85 which may lead to a 
geographical allocation of markets.8687 There is a different treatment between 
horizontal and vertical agreements; since vertical agreements are not made between 
competitors, they are not prima facie anti-competitive as a coordination of 
competitors. A prominent example of horizontal agreements is Price fixing88. 
 
Price Fixing is an agreement to fix prices and is by its very nature a restriction of 
competition. It also includes both direct and indirect price fixing, i.e. an agreement 
relating to any part of the price. It also includes both express agreements and 
concerted practices. The definition of price fixing is given in the Dyestuffs Case89: 
“Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in so doing 
the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the 
rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his 
                                                 
82 Bellamy & Child (2008) “European Community Law of Competition”, 6th Edition, p. 567 etc. 
83 Alberto Pera & Vito Auricchio (March 2015) “Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and The Objectives 
of Competition Policy”, The Objectives of Competition Policy, ECJ VOL. I NO. I, p. 155. 
84 See relevant case COMP/M.3141-CEMENTBOUW/ENCI/joint venture (2003) par. 18 and case 
COMP/M.3101-ACCOR/HILTON/SIX CONTINENTS/JV (2003) par.19. 
85 See case IV/30.320-fiber optics (1986), par. 48, 52, 53 and 57. 
86 Bellamy & Child (2008) “European Community Law of Competition”, 6th Edition, p. 560 and 569 etc. 
87 William M. Landes (1983) “Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers and Joint Ventures”, 52 Antitrust 
L.J. 625 1983, p. 628. 
88 Some examples of prohibited price-fixing are the following: jointly setting prices at specific levels, 
jointly observing list prices, jointly agreeing on the rate, time and place of price increases, jointly 
agreeing on an essential part of the price, jointly settling purchase prices and jointly prohibiting trade 
discounts in excess of a certain percentage. 
89 Case 48/69 ICI Ltd v EC Commission. 
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competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of 
action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success by prior elimination of all 
uncertainty as to each other’s conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, 
such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases.”  
 
D. THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS 
 
This kind of restrictions may be closely related to the agreements establishing a Joint 
Venture and may be so crucial to the founding parties, that the parties would not 
proceed to any business activity if it was not for them. These restrictions may be 
harmful to competition and can vary from supply arrangements to restrictive 
covenants and so on. Therefore, the EUMR attempted to mitigate the effects of these 
restrictions and the clearance decisions include also “restrictions directly related and 
necessary to the implementation of the concentration”,90 on the condition that they 
respect the principle of proportionality (ancillary restraints). In order to justify an 
ancillary restriction, it has to be proportionate; its duration, product and geographic 
scope must be only the absolutely necessary, that the JV requires. Restrictions, which 
are not justified as ancillary, will be evaluated under Article 101 TFEU. Restrictions that 
do not qualify as ancillary do not benefit from block exemption regulations and 
therefore, the parties have to consider if there is a chance to meet the individual 
exemption criteria of Article 101(3). 
 
E. PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS TO COMPETITION 
 
The most difficult tasks of competition authorities are the following: 
                                                 
90 EUMR Art 6(1) (b), Art 8(1) and (2) and Recital 21. See Commission Notice on restrictions directly 
related and necessary to concentrations (Notice on ancillary restraints) [2005] OJ C 56/24, 24 for 
guidance on the meaning of restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of a JV. In 
short, a restriction will be directly related to the establishment of the JV where it is economically 
connected to it and is intended to allow a smooth transition to the changed company structure after the 
concentration (Notice on ancillary restraints, para 12). A restriction will be necessary to the 
implementation of the JV if, in its absence, the JV would be impossible or considerably more difficult to 
implement, that is could only be implemented under more uncertain conditions, at substantially higher 
cost, over an appreciably longer period or with significantly less probability of success (Notice on 
ancillary restraints, para 13). 
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  To conduct effectively their thorough investigation and explain extensively the 
reasons for their conclusions; 
  To make profound research of JVs as a whole, and engage in an additional 
examination of any existing sub-agreement, which has the potential to produce 
anti-competitive effects; 
  To attempt to discuss competition issues that may emerge with the parties to 
the JV and incite them to make long-lasting commitments against anti-
competitive effects; 
  To limit the sanctions that apply to anti-competitive sub-agreements, detected 
in legitimate JVs.  
 
Without any doubt, it is very challenging to accomplish these demanding tasks, due to 
the fact that Joint Ventures have complex structural elements. However, it is possible 
that even a general guidance might be helpful to undertakings and their counselors 
and consequently in favor of promoting harmless arrangements, offering multiple 
benefits to both the economic market and consumers.91 It is absolutely rational that, 
without this guidance, businesses would be reluctant to commence a new venture, 
which ultimately could be extremely beneficial to the economy of a country. It is 
ultimately crucial to define exactly and without any doubt, what is and what is not 
legal.92  
 
To be more specific as far as competition review of JVs is concerned; this ought to 
include two basic parts. The first and foremost part should be a preliminary balancing 
of the joint ventures’ “costs” and “benefits”. In certain cases, the result is easy to be 
established. Nevertheless, there are cases, when the review appears to be difficult in 
the first place and further examination is appropriate. Each of the sub-agreements that 
may be included in the formation of a JV should be closely scrutinized. For instance, 
the competition agency could pose some clarifying questions; whether the restraints 
                                                 
91 See Chang, Evans and Schmalensee (2002) "Has The Consumer Harm Standard Lost Its Teeth", MIT 
Working Paper No 4263-02; PLJoskow, "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies" 
(2002) 18 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 95. 
92 “COMPETITION ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES”, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement 
Economiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 33 
   
26 
 
are connected to the JV and if they are important to the JV’s pro-competitive 
efficiencies.93 Should one of the questions are responded negatively, then the 
particular restraint must be prohibited. Otherwise, should the sub-agreement is 
connected to the JV and is essential in order to accomplish its pro-competitive 
efficiencies, the competition committee can accept or reject it, depending on the net 
competitive effect.94 
 
Both parts are difficult to be applied effectively, with the latter part being the most 
challenging. The real challenge is to clarify what is “necessary” and what is not. A 
restraint in competition should not generally be acceptable, except the JV would not 
actually be formed without it. Alternatively, a restriction would make a JV more 
attractive to its participants, for it assists in ensuring commitment. 
 
For instance, a recent case that was examined in summer 2016 is the following: 95 
The European Commission has recently dealt with the proposed creation of a joint 
venture in the Netherlands, by the mobile telecom operator Vodafone and the cable 
company Liberty Global. The Commission has examined this proposal under the EUMR 
and has reached a conditional decision. The Commission focused its concern on the 
fact that this proposed JV would vanish the benefits and advantages brought to the 
Dutch telecoms market by Vodafone’s market entry. Due to the fact that there was not 
an intention of merging, Vodafone had indeed the power to turn into a strong 
competitor, in the field of fixed line and fixed-mobile multiple play services to 
consumers. The Commission, convinced by the divestment proposed by Vodafone to 
divest its retail consumer fixed line business in the Netherlands, actually decided to 
clear this telecom merger in Phase I. Commissioner in charge of competition policy 
Margrethe Vestager actually stated that the telecoms market is very important to the 
digital society and she pleasantly welcomed the formation of the JV between Vodafone 
                                                 
93 Alberto Pera & Vito Auricchio (March 2015) “Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and The Objectives 
of Competition Policy”, The Objectives of Competition Policy, ECJ Vol. I No. I, P. 154 
94 “COMPETITION ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES”, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement 
Economiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 33 
95 European Commission - Press release, Mergers: Commission clears Vodafone/Liberty Global telecoms 
joint venture, subject to conditions; rejects referral request by Dutch competition authority, Brussels, 3 
August 2016 
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and Liberty Global in the Netherlands. The belief that better services will be provided 
to Dutch consumers was considered to be of utmost importance. 
 
Finally, it is worth to be mentioned that, in the early 1970s in the US, following the 
interesting legal and economic analysis that was carried out at the University of 
Chicago, an idea was established concerning competitive arrangements. More 
specifically, competitive arrangements were to be evaluated, in relation to their effects 
on the market and their ability to offer benefits.96 In this regard, Richard Posner 
supported the idea that, competitive restraints should be assessed according to their 
effects on consumer welfare, i.e., on whether they led to a reduction in output or a 
deterioration of products’ quality.97 In fact, he was absolutely in favor of a price 
theory, which basically suggests that, if an agreement among undertakings or even a 
certain practice leads to an improvement in consumer welfare, then this might be 
taken as a prima facie evidence that it is pro-competitive. This was concluded on the 
grounds that it promotes efficiency in the use of resources and certainly in any case, 
competition must still exist in the market, in order to have efficiency gains for the 
consumers.  
 
F. COMMITMENTS AND SANCTIONS 
 
Consequently, it is to be mentioned that competition agencies could (and should) 
encourage commitments, which might help a JV be less likely to be anti-competitive.98 
                                                 
96 Among the most influential works, see R Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Basic Books, 1978); GJ Stigler, 
The Organization of Industry, (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
97 See R Posner, "The Social Cost of Monopoly" (1975) 83 Journal of Political Economy 807, p. 27; WM 
Landes and R Posner, "Market Power in Antitrust Cases" [1981] Harvard Law Review 937; R Posner, 
Antitrust Law (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1976). For an opinion about the effects on 
xompetition policy on consumer welfare, see RW Crandall and C Winston, "Does Antitrust Policy 
Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence" (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3. 
98 Case COMP/M.3101-ACCOR/HILTON/SIX CONTINENTS/JV (2003), where the JV was actually the 
distributor of the hotel services offered by the parents (bookings etc.). The competition issue concerned 
the information exchange that would take place, due to the fact the JV would receive and use 
information of all cooperating undertakings. This would probably lead to an abuse of the information 
exchanged on behalf of the parent undertakings, for they could use this data in order to control the seek 
and demand and fix their prices accordingly, especially in markets where they enjoyed a high market 
share. However, this doubts were relieved, due to the firewalls and confidentiality obligations that the 
parties included in the JV agreement and were engaged to. 
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For instance, it could be advisable that certain assets stay out of the JV. As far as the 
sanctions are concerned, this matter can present a lot of difficulties. If a JV is found to 
be anti-competitive at something in particular, then there should exist severe reasons 
to prohibit it. It would probably be treated like an anti-competitive merger.  
 
On the other hand, should anti-competitive sub-agreements are found, which are not 
connected to the JV, there might be a possibility to subject them to the same 
sanctions, suitable for behaviors outside a JV context. If there is some rational 
connection to the JV, and also pro-competitive efficiencies do exist, but a clause is 
prohibited owing to its net anti-competitive effect, then leniency is justified.   
 
In fact, a prohibited clause should probably benefit from more favorable treatment, 
than would have been the case for the same type of behavior, outside the JV context. 
Such leniency is justified on fairness grounds. Many competition agencies have 
published enforcement guidelines regarding JVs, where they propose the application 
of certain measures, such as giving general block exemptions99 for JVs that qualify or 
imposing more lenient sanctions. 
 
In order to assess the formation of a Joint Venture and evaluate its effects in the 
market, we ought to consider the anti-competitive (costs) and the pro-competitive 
(benefits) efficiencies. JVs that present an extremely low or on the contrary, very high 
cost-benefit ratio, are more easily examined. However, the case is usually more 
difficult to assess. For instance, some JVs have multiple anti-competitive effects, 
whereas at the same time they offer considerable benefits. Such kind of JVs will not 
probably catch the competition authorities’ attention; thus, they will normally be 
approved.  
 
On the other hand, there are some joint ventures, which not only have no benefits, but 
also, they threaten to distort competition. In fact, there is no actual integration among 
                                                                                                                                               
 
99 Robert Lane (2007) “Competition law”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 3 
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the parent undertakings, but often a cartel is hidden behind the creation of a JV. 
Therefore, in this case, a competition review is essential, so as to carefully assess both 
the pro, and the anti-competitive effects. The assessment should definitely include the 
examination of a joint venture’s founding agreement, the governance structure, the 
JV’ s duration, the nature and extent of assets transferred to the JV and finally the 
possibility parent companies have to compete with each other and with the JV. 
Furthermore, any clauses aspiring to raise barriers to entry or expansion of third 
parties should also be investigated. The investigation should be complete and include a 
formal market definition, concentration levels and so on.  
 
It should also be mentioned that, JVs with pro-competitive effects are generally 
permitted,100 other than the cases, when they contain serious anti-competitive 
restrictions. Normally in these cases, it is to be examined whether these restrictions on 
competitive behavior are reasonably related to the JV’s efficiencies. However, the 
concept of “reasonably related” is quite broad and therefore difficult to be defined. 
 
G.  SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS 
 
There are many guidelines, which offer safe harbor provisions for those joint ventures, 
which have low market shares. These provisions basically offer protection to legitimate 
joint ventures below a specific market share threshold. In fact, the rule is that the 
lower the market share is, the less likely is a joint venture to present anti-competitive 
effects. Furthermore, with view to assisting joint ventures in assessing whether they 
are legal or not, certain countries have adopted special statutory regimes, or block 
exemptions provisions. However, it has been observed that, these initiatives may 
prevent joint ventures from structuring themselves as they wish.  
 
 
                                                 
100 See, for instance, decision COMP/M.3099-Areva/Urenco/ETC JV (2004), par. 242, where the 
Commission took into account the pro-competitive efficiencies that emerged from the JV, so as to 
approve its creation. More specifically, the Commission concluded that the concentration would lead to 
technology exchange and Areva would be more competitive, than it was before, when it operated with 
less developed methods (gas diffusion plant). The competition related doubts that were raised were 
entirely vanished, due to the commitments submitted by the parties. 
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V. THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO JOINT VENTURES 
 
The competition policy of the European Union has been most formalistic, regarding its 
perception for joint ventures. In fact, it has been restrictive. The European Commission 
is most interested in competition matters and has devoted much time and effort, so as 
to assess JVs and their structure, as well as whether they qualify as mergers. On the 
contrary, there are many jurisdictions, which have mainly focused on the economic 
aspects and effects in the market. They concentrate on more practical aspects, 
attempting to evaluate the entire effect of the JV integrating in the market.  
 
Despite the fact that the EU has preserved this approach for several time, recent 
guidelines and revised block exemptions have shown a different perspective in favor of 
a more economic view of the matter.101 This provokes a less formalistic approach and 
the development of a practical mentality, which embraces free competition, combined 
with financial welfare.102 
 
A. THE CASE WHERE THE MERGER REGULATION IS APPLICABLE 
 
The questions of whether EU law applies to a Joint Venture, which exact legal regime 
and who will decide on the legality of a Joint Venture depend on factors, which are 
already designated by the European Commission. The economic resources of the JV, 
combined with the structure of the cooperation define this matter. Therefore, where a 
JV reaches the turnover thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation103 (EUMR) and is 
structured in such a way as to fall within its scope, the EC will have sole jurisdiction to 
decide on the legality of a JV and it must not be implemented until it has been notified 
to and cleared by the European Commission104.  
                                                 
101 Alberto Pera & Vito Auricchio (March 2015) “Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and The 
Objectives of Competition Policy”, The Objectives of Competition Policy, ECJ Vol. I No. I, p. 158. 
102 “COMPETITION ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES”, Organisation de Coopération et de Développement 
Economiques, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 33 
103 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
104 EUMR, Art 7(1) 'A concentration with a Community [now EU] dimension as defined in Article 1, or 
which is to be examined by the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5), shall not be implemented either 
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i) Jurisdiction 
 
The EUMR enumerates the conditions, under which the European Commission or the 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) have jurisdiction over concentrations. 
Generally speaking, the rule is that concentrations with EU dimension are to be 
examined by the Commission, whilst those, which do not have EU dimension, are to be 
investigated by the NCAs, following their national merger control rules. However, there 
is an exception to this general rule; for there are procedures, under which parties have 
pre-notification contacts with the authorities, in order to reallocate jurisdiction 
between the Commission and the NCAs. Furthermore, post-notification procedures 
also exist, where the cases are reallocated between those two, and in fact, in some 
specific circumstances, Member States are allowed to apply their domestic laws to 
concentrations that have EU dimension.  
ii) Mandatory Notification and Waiting Period 
 
Concentrations, which fall under the EUMR must be notified to the Commission and are 
not to be implemented, until the Commission investigates them and decides their 
compatibility with the single market. The implementing Regulation describes the forms 
to be completed, when concentrations are being notified to the Commission.105 The 
European Commission has also promulgated multiple Notices, in order to clarify how 
the Merger Regulation is applied.  
 
According to the EUMR, parties should notify about the creation of their Joint Ventures 
any time,106 after the conclusion of the relevant agreement or on showing the 
                                                                                                                                               
before its notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common market pursuant to a 
decision under Articles 6(1) (b), 8(1) or 8(2), or on the basis of a presumption according to Article 10(6)'. 
Breach of this provision can be sanctioned by fines of up to ten per cent of the parties' worldwide 
turnover (see EUMR, Art 14(2)). 
105 Commission Regulation (EC) 802/2004 (OJ 2004 L133/1, 30.4.2004), as amended by Commission Reg. 
(EC) 1033/2008 (OJ 2008 L279/3, 22.10.2008) and Commission Implementing Reg. (EU) 1269/2013 (OJ 
2013 L336/1, 14.12.2013).  
106 Under the EUMR, when the Commission receives a notification, it publishes a summary of the case in 
question, in order to receive third party comments. It is clear that the Commission has decided to follow 
this procedural rule, when it receives notifications in cooperative cases. This was done for the first time 
in the Carlsberg-Tetley case ((1992) O.J. C97/21). 
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intention to do so.107 Before the actual notification, the JV might pass the pre-
notification stage. After the notification, the EC is going to rule upon the compatibility 
to European law in 25 working days, for cases that are easy to decide and go through 
Phase I. However, should any remedies be asked for, another 10 days can be given. 
Phase II, for more demanding cases (two to three percent of cases)108, may last from 
90 to 125 working days. After the expiration of these deadlines, which are meant to 
give time, so as to check the legality of new JVs, these will be normally implemented, 
unless they are banned, for being opposed to competition rules. Joint Ventures outside 
the scope of the EUMR are not to be notified in EU level, but may be subject to 
national law.  
iii) Commission Investigations 
 
It has already been mentioned that, concentrations notified under the Merger 
Regulation are thoroughly examined by the European Commission, with view to 
concluding whether they are compatible with the internal market or not. When a 
concentration is formally notified, in the majority of cases, the investigation ends 
within “Phase I” time period of 25 working days. In case the Commission proceeds to a 
“Phase II” investigation, this can take a further six months.109 
 
B. THE CASE WHERE THE MERGER REGULATION IS NOT APPLICABLE 
 
In case a JV does not fulfill the necessary elements, in order for the Merger Regulation 
to be applicable, it should be examined under national law and under Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union110 (TFEU), which applies to 
agreements between undertakings111, that restrict/distort competition. Article 101 
                                                 
107 See EUMR, Art. 4(1) 
108 Andrew Renshaw and Jan Blockx (Summer/Fall 2013) “Judicial Review of Mergers in the EU”, THE 
ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 58, Nos. 2 & 3, 495 
109 Slaughter and May (Summer 2016) “The EU Merger Regulation, An overview of the European merger 
control rules” 
110 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326, 26 October 2012. 
111 The term 'undertaking' refers to a business with a market presence, to which a market turnover can 
be clearly attributed (Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice) 
[2008] OJ C 95/1, para 24). 
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TFEU requires parties to self-assess their Joint Ventures, instead of prior notification to 
the European Commission. Both the European Commission and the national 
competition authorities can consider JVs under this provision and take enforcement 
action, when necessary. As a consequence, when the parties decide to cooperate, they 
have to be fully aware of these vital procedural distinctions. 
 
When a JV is not jointly controlled or does not meet the criterion of full-functionality 
and instead is a partial JV with no sufficient structure and durable effects, this specific 
Article may apply.112 Article 101 TFEU requires that, not only the Joint Ventures’ 
arrangements restrict competition in the common market by object or effect, but also, 
they affect trade among Member States. The second requirement is meant to limit the 
scope of this particular Article and exclude agreements, which have an effect only in 
one Member State, or even outside the European Union. Where the competition 
authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law to 
agreements or practices, which may affect trade between Member States, they are 
required by Regulation 1/2003 to apply Art 101 (and Art 102) TFEU. Art 3(2) of the 
Regulation 1/2003 does not allow stricter national laws than Art 101 TFEU to be 
applicable. There is a Commission Notice about Guidelines on the effect on trade 
concept contained in Arts 101 and 102 TFEU) [2004] OJ C 101/81 (Guidelines on the 
effect on trade). In particular, trade concerns every cross-border activity and the effect 
needs only to be possible, indirect and is found, where it influences the pattern of 
trade.  
i) The Assessment Under ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
 
With view to determine whether an agreement distorts competition, it is crucial that 
we first define the relevant market, where the anti-competitive effects take place. In 
particular, the definition of the relevant market is most important in anti-competitive 
agreements, in a possible abuse of a dominant position and in merger reviews. It is 
necessary to assess the market power and market share of undertakings, which 
                                                 
112 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, Allen & Overy, Brussels, 10 Competition L. Int'l 5 2014, p. 15.  
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through certain practices have the ability to distort and restrict competition.113 As far 
as mergers are concerned, these are only examined in the case of permanent 
coordination of undertakings. Whereas market definition helps analyse agreements’ 
effects on competition114, it is not indispensable for detecting a competition 
infringement, if an agreement is liable to affect trade within EU.115 This is actually the 
case with cartels, which constitute per se infringements.  
 
Definition of the relevant market is indispensable in merger reviews, although it can 
prove to be a very difficult venture requiring voluminous data and comprehensive 
market investigation. The concepts of relevant products and relevant geographic 
markets are complicated enough to be defined but unfortunately, without them the 
proper economic analysis would be impossible. In a nutshell, the relevant product or 
service market includes all products or services, which are considered to be 
interchangeable or substitutable by consumers, taking into account their 
characteristics, prices and intended use.116 In addition, the relevant geographic market 
is the area, where the undertakings concerned, are involved in the supply and demand 
of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas, due to the 
fact that the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas. It is 
obvious that the determination of the relevant market is a task, which requires the 
thorough examination of each case separately and very carefully, depending on the 
nature of the competition issues examined.  
 
What is more, regarding relevant product markets, the methodology used to define 
relevant markets is the same in all antitrust areas but the relevant timeline varies. In 
merger review cases, the authorities focus on likely future situations, capable of 
distorting competition rules. Finally, there are many decisive factors to delineate the 
relevant geographic market. For instance, the significant price differences between 
                                                 
113 I Kokkoris (2005) “The concept of Market Definition and the SSNIP Test in the Merger Appraisal”, 
ECLR 209. 
114 T-25/99, Roberts. 
115 T-374/94, European Night Services. 
116 DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, ROUNDTABLE 
ON MARKET DEFINITION, Note by the Delegation of the European Union, DAF/COMP/WD (2012)28. 
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different geographic areas, the significant transport costs or the basic demand 
characteristics and views of customers and competitors, in particular consumer 
preferences and habits are only few of the multiple determinant factors. To sum up, in 
the case of the formation of a new Joint Venture, the markets are really difficult to 
determine, because the analysis must be broad enough, in order to cover all potential 
relevant markets.  
 
Regarding Article 101, it must be noted that it consists of two steps. The first step, 
under Article 101(1), is to assess whether an agreement between undertakings, which 
is capable of affecting trade between Member States, has an anti-competitive object 
or actual or potential117 restrictive effects on competition. The second step, under 
Article 101(3), which only concerns anti-competitive agreements within the scope of 
Article 101(1), examines whether there are pro-competitive effects, which justify the 
negative effects on competition.118 The difficult task to determine the restrictive and 
pro-competitive effects is strictly done, within the framework of Article 101(3).119 
When the pro-competitive effects cannot justify a restriction of competition, Article 
101(2) demands that the agreement must be automatically void. The parties may be 
also subject to fines.  
 
It ought to be mentioned that, the analysis of horizontal co-operation agreements 
(among competitors) has many common features with the analysis of horizontal 
mergers pertaining to the potential restrictive effects, in particular as far as JVs are 
concerned. Sometimes it is very difficult to distinguish between full-function JVs, which 
are examined under the EUMR, and non full-function JVs, which are assessed under 
Article 101. Their effects can be very similar.120  
 
                                                 
117 Article 101(1) prohibits both actual and potential anti-competitive effects; see for example Case C-
7/95 P, John Deere, [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 77; Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, [2006] ECR I-11125, 
paragraph 50. 
118 See Joined Cases C-501/06 P and others, GlaxoSmithKline, [2009] ECR I-9291, paragraph 95. 
119 See Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods, [2003] ECR II-4653, paragraph 107; Case T-112/99, 
Métropole télévision (M6) and others, [2001] ECR II-2459, paragraph 74; Case T-328/03, O2, [2006] ECR 
II-1231, paragraphs 69 et seq., where the General Court held that it is only in the exact framework of 
Article 101(3) that the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction may be assessed. 
120 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal co-operation agreements, (Text with EEA relevance), (2011/C 11/01) 
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Joint Ventures’ parties to cooperative agreements must self-assess the legality of their 
cooperation. Should the EC take a formal decision, this will probably be to find that the 
JV is not satisfying the legality criteria121 or otherwise, the parties to agreements that 
are under legality examination, may alter their cooperation, in order to comply with 
the European law, without facing the consequences of an illegality decision.122 
 
ii) Basic Principles for Assessment Under ARTICLE 101(1) TFEU 
 
To begin with, Article 101(1) prohibits agreements, whose object or effect is to 
restrict123 competition. Restrictions of competition by object are those restrictions that 
have the power to restrict competition by their nature. For instance, price fixing or 
geographic/customer allocation. An exception is made only for production JVs, which 
necessarily include agreement on output.124 It is very crucial to point out that, once an 
anti-competitive object has been found, it is absolutely not necessary to assess the 
actual or potential effects of an agreement.  
 
On the other hand, should a horizontal cooperation agreement does not restrict 
competition by object, it ought to be assessed whether it has appreciable restrictive 
effects on competition. Due attention must be paid to both actual and potential 
affects. Therefore, the particular agreement must have at least likely anti-competitive 
effects. For an agreement to have restrictive effects within the meaning of Article 
101(1), it must have an actual or likely appreciable impact on at least one of the 
parameters of competition on the market, such as price, product quality, product 
variety or innovation.125 These adverse effects can impede competition either between 
                                                 
121 See, for example, case COMP/C2/38.698 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and 
Composers (CISAC) [2008]. On 12 April 2013, the general court partially annulled on appeal the EC's 
decision finding that contracts between CISAC and 21 of its collecting society member associations 
infringed Art 101(1) TFEU (caseT-442/08CISAC v Commission [2013]). 
122 See, for example, case COMP/C-2/37.214Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga 
[2005]; Case COMP/38.173 joint selling of the media rights to the FA Premier League [2006]; case 
COMP/AT.39595 Continental/ United/Lufthansa/Air Canada [2013]; case COMP/39.596 BA/AA/IB 
[2010]. 
123 The term “restriction of competition” includes both prevention and distortion of competition. 
124 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, Allen & Overy, Brussels, 10 Competition L. Int'l 5 2014, p. 24. 
125 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal co-operation agreements, (Text with EEA relevance), (2011/C 11/01) 
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the parties to the agreement, or between any of them and third parties. The 
agreement must reduce parties’ decision-making independence, owing to obligations 
included in the agreement, that regulate the market conduct of at least one of the 
parties, or otherwise by influencing the market conduct of at least one of the parties, 
by simply provoking a change to its motivation.126 
 
Horizontal cooperation agreements between competitors, which could not accomplish 
their purpose in an autonomous way and on their own, do not normally raise 
competition concerns under Article 101(1), unless of course they could pursue their 
activities with less severe restrictions. The elements of the agreement to be examined 
are mainly the field and the particular purpose of the agreement, the relationship 
between the parties and many more. These factors somehow restrict the competition 
problems that possibly emerge. The agreements may distort competition in many 
ways, so the research has to focus its assessment in certain fields.  
 
For instance, the agreements may restrict the right of the parties to compete against 
each other or even third parties as autonomous economic factors or as parties to 
different agreements. What is more, the parties may be requested to contribute their 
assets or even the agreement may influence the parties’ interest, so that their 
decision-making is deliberately limited. This way, the parties to the agreement would 
not compete anymore and additionally, they would probably find it appealing to 
proceed to anti-competitive activities, such as price increases. Analysis of further 
factors is also very crucial in this regard, in order to assess these agreements, for 
example market elements.  
 
A horizontal cooperation agreement might also include the revelation of commercially 
vital information and strengthen the level of the parties’ coordination. This way, the 
parties may coordinate their market behaviour more easily and combine their 
activities in the specific area of cooperation to an appreciable extent; for instance, 
when they jointly manufacture a significant product. Consequently, such an agreement 
is able to limit the decision-making ability and facilitate the coordination between 
                                                 
126 Horizontal Guidelines, para 27. 
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parties, which aspire to reach even higher profits through this kind of practices.  
 
Furthermore, it has already been mentioned that, the EUMR is not to be applied, when 
the acquisition of minority shareholdings fall short of decisive influence. These cases 
may be within the scope of Article 101 TFEU, when there would probably be 
cooperation between/among competitors127, or might be examined under Article 102 
TFEU, in cases when there is an abuse of dominant position by the acquiring 
shareholder.128 
iii) Basic Principles for Assessment Under ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU 
 
Article 101(3) is basically the evaluation of the pro-competitive effects of restrictive 
agreements. This Article is meant to potentially justify an Article 101(1) infringement. 
The burden of proof under Article 101(3) belongs to the undertaking, which claims 
there is a lawful exception. Consequently, the undertaking must present evidence so 
as to convince the Commission that the agreement is very likely to have pro-
competitive effects.  
 
There are four conditions, which must be fulfilled cumulatively, in order for Article 
101(3) to apply. Regarding JVs, these conditions require that: 
 
 The JV promotes the improvement of the production and distribution of 
goods and contributes to economic and technical progress;  
 The efficiency gains cannot possibly be achieved by less severe restrictions; 
 Consumers benefit appreciably from the efficiency gains and they are at least 
compensated for the indispensable restrictions; and 
 The JV does not allow the parties to eliminate competition regarding a part of 
the products or services provided.  
 
                                                 
127 Joined cases 142 and 156/84 British America Tobacco Company Ltd and RJReynolds Industries,Inc v 
Commission of the European Communities [1987] ECR 04487; case IV/34.410 Olivetti-Digital [1994] OJ L 
309/24; case IV/35.617 Phoenix/GlobalOne[1996] OJ L 239/57. 
128 Case IV/33.440 Warner-Lambert/Gillette and Others and case IV/33.486 BIC/Giette and Others OJ L 
116/21 [1993]. 
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When these four conditions are satisfied cumulatively, then the JV is supposed to have 
a neutral net effect on competition. Pro-competitive effects are then supposed to 
justify the restrictive effects on competition.  
 
C. EUMR & ARTICLE 101 TFEU: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
 
Joint Ventures, which meet the necessary criteria and are investigated under the 
EUMR, have the opportunity to acquire the benefits from one-stop-shop clearance129, 
without being obliged to cope with the considerable costs and administrative burden 
of separate notification obligations in EU Member States and with the inevitable risk of 
different decisions. This provides JVs with legal certainty and the belief that the 
European Commission conducts its work in a fair and objective way. Besides, the 
European Commission makes decisions on compatibility with the EU competition law 
within a certain time period, which usually is no longer than 25 working days from the 
notification date.130  
 
On the contrary, since 2004, parties to an agreement are not able to notify to the EC 
under Article 101 TFEU and are obliged to proceed to self-assessment. Nevertheless, 
the EC is competent to take an exemption decision or guidance letter, should there are 
public interest reasons. Furthermore, the European Commission has promulgated 
guidelines131, so as to assist the parties to agreements in their assessment and has also 
offered the possibility of block exemptions provisions, which apply to horizontal 
                                                 
129 EUMR, Recital 8 
130 However, according to Judy Mackenzie and Stuart Alec Burnside, (“Joint Venture analysis: the latest 
chapter”, European Competition Law Review, 1995, p. 2) the parties are obliged to abstain from any 
activity for two months before the Commission gives a preliminary view (and it will only do this in the 
case of ‘structural’ joint ventures). A comfort letter may be issued at this time. Nevertheless, this offers 
only some legal security. Alternatively, the Commission may give notice of intention to grant within a set 
period an exemption under Article 85(3) or a warning letter that the Commission intends to open a full 
investigation into the agreement, both of which mean that the parties may have to wait for a long 
period of time, even years, before receiving a binding decision (see for example Philips/Osram where 
almost three years elapsed between notification and decision); 
131 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Art 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1 (Horizontal Guidelines); 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now 101(3) TFEU] of the Treaty OJ C 101, 27 April 2004, 
97-118. 
   
40 
 
cooperation agreements132 and provide businesses with legal certainty.  
 
What is more, it ought to be mentioned that, the EUMR clearance decision has no 
expiry date and also, is not influenced by changes in market conditions. The decision 
can only be affected, when it comes to incorrect information or when the parties are 
not following the decision’s obligations. However, should any alterations take place 
regarding the quality of control of a JV, this undoubtedly requires new notification.133  
 
Some possible disadvantages of applying the EUMR are the following; first of all, the 
Regulation is very strictly applied by the European Commission and no action is 
permitted before clearance. Therefore, it is obvious that, the standstill obligation is 
most crucial for the EC. 134 Consequently, in cases when time is very significant as to 
the formation of Joint Ventures, the inevitable procedure of the EUMR can be 
detrimental to the best interests of Joint Ventures. Finally, during the investigation 
procedures, disclosure of classified elements can possibly raise antitrust 
considerations. This can be particularly challenging for businesses, taking into account 
the fact that, the European Commission’s (December 2013) modification of notification 
procedures demands even more substantial document revelation in every single case, 
including those treated under the simplified procedure.135  
 
 
                                                 
132 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Art 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development 
agreements (R&D Block Exemption Regulation) [2010] OJ L 335/36; Commission Regulation (EU) No 
1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Art 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to certain categories of specialization agreements (Specialization Block Exemption 
Regulation) [2010] OJ L 335/43. 
133 Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, para 107. 
134 A derogation from the standstill obligation under Art 7(1) EUMR may be granted by the EC in limited 
circumstances: EUMR, Art 7(3): 'The Commission may, on request, grant a derogation from the 
obligations imposed in paragraphs 1 or 2. The request to grant a derogation must be reasoned. In 
deciding on the request, the Commission shall take into account inter alia the effects of the suspension 
on one or more undertakings concerned by the concentration or on a third party and the threat to 
competition posed by the concentration. Such a derogation may be made subject to conditions and 
obligations in order to ensure conditions of effective competition. A derogation may be applied for and 
granted at any time, be it before notification or after the transaction.' 
135 Vanessa Turner and Francesca Miotto (2014) “International Joint Ventures: Overcoming Competition 
Law Hurdles in the EU”, Allen & Overy, Brussels, 10 Competition L. Int'l 5 2014, p. 17. 
   
41 
 
VI. SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
 
A. ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHENOMENON 
 
The creation of a concentrative JV has the potential to produce many serious effects in 
the internal market, this is why the European Commission tries to deal with them 
effectively. A brand-new player enters the market and influences the economic 
situation of the relevant market. The main particularity of the JV, in relation to any 
other concentration, is that, it has at least two parent undertakings.136 This has a great 
impact on competition, because the JV constitutes the result of collaboration between 
two commercially and functionally independent undertakings, which may be 
competitors. Their commercial relationship is not temporary, due to the fact that they 
have decided to establish together a new undertaking.  
 
It ought to be mentioned that, the parties to a JV are supposed to remain competitors 
outside the scope of the functional and economic aspects of the JV. Competitors 
normally do not communicate with each other their future plans and business 
intentions and certainly they do not reveal information about prices or marketing. 
However, should they do communicate, various consequences may arise.  
 
On the other hand, as far as JV issues are concerned, parties may and are expected to 
communicate and plan jointly their commercial activities. But how can we be assured 
that joint venturers work for the purposes of the JV, without providing sensitive 
information to each other and having a collusive conduct? One way to achieve this, is 
to ensure that different personnel is working for the goals of the JV. There has to be a 
firewall between the JV with its own personnel, in separate facilities and the still-
competing parent undertakings. There must also be organizational and functional 
                                                 
136 This is exactly the particular feature of the JV, compared to any subsidiary company, which belongs to 
the exclusive control of the parent. Subsidiaries, together with the parent companies, constitute a single 
economic unit, whereas the JV does not belong to the parent undertakings. The parents actually share 
their assets and have joint control over the JV. In the case of a single economic unit, the European case 
law treats internal activities as sole actions and not collusion (see for example case C-73/95, Viho 
Europe BV v Commission). Therefore, such activities are evaluated under Article 102 and not under 
Article 101 TFEU. 
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firewalls in reality and not only theoretically. There must exist some boundaries, in 
order to avoid spillover effects.137 
 
Consequently, JVs have certainly great potential to offer multiple benefits for the 
market, but they are also able to cause competition problems. Free competition law 
regards cooperation between competitors as suspicious and Article 101 TFEU is 
basically a prohibition and exceptionally acceptable. In any case, the collaboration 
between competitors has several effects. Despite the multiple benefits that can 
obviously and without any doubt arise, the autonomous activities of the market 
players must be ensured because even the mere fact that, two (previously) 
competitors have decided to collaborate leads to the conclusion that, ideal and 
transparent competition will not exist anymore. Just the fact that they probably share 
sensitive information may distort competition. As a consequence, it is highly possible 
that, the cooperation between undertakings through the JV in one field might have as a 
result the restriction of competition in other fields. If there is indeed anti-competitive 
coordination between the parents, then the creation of the JV was the event that 
caused this result.138 It is then to be assessed, whether the creation of the JV can by 
itself lead to the coordination of the behavior of the parties that restricts 
competition.139 There is apparently a greater danger, when the parents are actual or 
potential competitors. In this case, the administration of the JV, which is elected by the 
parents, will tend to plan its activities, taking into account the interests of the parent 
undertakings, creating anti-competitive effects in their relationship.140   
 
Such a restriction of competition, provoked by the mere creation of the JV, constitutes 
an anti-competitive side effect141 that extends in several fields, where the parent 
undertakings operate (“spillover effect”142). The economic aspect and explanation of 
                                                 
137 Richard J. Hoskins (2002) “Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Competitor Collaborations: A 
Primer for The Corporate Lawyer”, 10 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 119, pp. 119-122-123. 
138 Marsia N. Vitali (2015) “Joint Ventures: The cooperation between multiple undertakings in 
Competition Law”, Nomiki Vivliothiki S.A., p. 31. 
139 Ritter L. et al. (1991) “EEC Competition Law. A practitioner’s guide”, p. 396. 
140 Ritter L. et al. (1991) “EEC Competition Law. A practitioner’s guide”, p. 396. 
141 Sotiropoulos G. (1998) “The Joint Venture under free competition protection law”, European 
Commercial Law, p. 749.  
142 Bellamy & Child (2008) “European Community Law of Competition”, 6th Edition, p. 773. 
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the phenomenon is that, when the controlling undertakings produce the same or 
similar products with the JV, then the competition between the participating parties in 
the relevant product market is affected by the joint control; for instance, when the 
controlling undertakings define the prices of the JV’s products, then they will probably 
take into account their own prices for their own products, and they will come up with a 
price agreement. This effect is inherent or direct143 consequence of the joint control 
that exists in JV between horizontal competitors, as there is a structural link that 
connects them and facilitates their coordination. This is why spillover effects are 
assessed together with the whole transaction, under the Regulation for 
concentrations.144  
 
The significance of spillover effects cannot be doubted, as the phenomenon can have 
tremendous consequences. Besides, there is a possibility to have even greater 
consequences between the undertakings that cooperate, than through their 
cooperation for the establishment of the JV.145 For this reason, all relevant product and 
geographical markets, where the undertakings operate, must be defined, so as to see 
whether there is a possibility to have cooperation there too.146 The cooperation 
through the functions of the JV may be limited, but the consequences from the 
cooperation in other fields may be enormous. 
 
B. TREATMENT OF THE PHENOMENON  
 
The Commission insists on the notions of probability, possibility and on the risk of 
coordination, instead of trying to prove that the coordination is the object or effect of 
the JV’s creation. This is regarded as reasonable, given the fact that we have a prior 
                                                 
143 Ritter L., Braun D. (2004) “European Competition Law: A practitioner’s guide”, 3rd Edition, p. 616. 
144 Ritter L., Braun D., (2004) “European Competition Law: A practitioner’s guide”, 3rd Edition, p. 615-
616. 
145 E. Mastromanolis (2013) “Free Competition Law”, p. 351 
146 The legislator demands that, when a JV is regarded to be a concentration, the undertakings must 
disclose beforehand, through the CO form, all elements that are capable of leading to a coordination, 
i.e. the relevant markets they operate, the economic activities they are engaged into etc. (see 
Implementing Regulation 1269/2013, Section 10 of Annex I: “Cooperative effects of a joint venture”, for 
the application of Article 2 par.4 of the Regulation for concentrations. 
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assessment and future predictions.147 Therefore, the legislator has preferred a prior 
assessment of the possibility of coordination between the parent undertakings, so as 
to prevent it, if possible, from happening. The prevention is certainly preferable, in 
comparison with the repressive measures of Article 101 TFEU, when competition has 
already been distorted. However, due to the fact that the possibility of coordination 
between competitors is always possible, Article 101 is always possible to be applied. 
Therefore, the legislator chose to include Article 2 par. 4 and 5 in the Regulation for 
concentrations, which mentions exactly the afore-mentioned comments.  
 
The Commission takes into serious consideration certain elements, which may lead to 
the conclusion that there is coordination of the competitive behavior between 
independent undertakings. In particular, the EC takes into account the possibility that 
two at least parent undertakings operate their activities in the same or similar relevant 
market with the JV and the possibility that the coordination which exists from the 
creation of the JV provides the participating undertakings with the ability to eliminate 
competition for a considerable part of these products/services.  
 
Consequently, in order to conclude that we have indeed restriction of competition, 
according to Article 101 par.1 TFEU, it is absolutely indispensable that the coordination 
of the competitive behavior of the parent undertakings is possible, considerable and is 
a result of the JV’s creation, either as its object or as its consequence.148  
 
C. EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S APPROACH 
 
When a full-function JV has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive 
conduct of the parent undertakings, then Article 2(4) EUMR imposes the obligation to 
assess this behavior under the elements of Article 101(1) and (3), as part of the merger 
control assessment. However, it must be mentioned that, the potential of coordinating 
commercial behavior by the parties emerges and happens only when at least two 
                                                 
147 Navarro et al., p. 56-57. 
148 Marsia N. Vitali (2015) “Joint Ventures: The cooperation between multiple undertakings in 
Competition Law”, Nomiki Vivliothiki S.A., p. 34.  
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parent companies are engaged in important activities in the same or related markets 
as the JV. In addition, coordinated behavior149 may arise, when these companies are 
potential competitors in the markets in question.150 Should there is no actual evidence 
that the object of the JV is indeed to facilitate the collaboration among parents, it is 
crucial that it is examined whether such collaboration is the direct and likely effect of 
the creation of the JV. Such antitrust collaboration exists particularly, when there is 
exchange of useful information151, entry market barriers for other competitors152 or 
discriminatory treatment of third parties.153 It must be examined in this regard, 
whether the parties have in fact the possibility as well as the motivation needed so as 
to coordinate. The necessary analysis will concentrate on parties’ market power in 
relevant markets and the structure of these markets. There must be of course a causal 
link between the JV and this collaboration.  
 
                                                 
149 Although coordinated effects as a result of collective dominance and coordinated effects between JV 
parents are subject to two different tests (SIEC and Art 101 TFEU), in practice, the same facts are often 
relevant to both so that the two analyses often coexist. 
150 Case COMP/JV.28 Sydkraft/LEWIHansa Energy Trading [1999], para 27. 
151 See, for example, case COMP/M.4760 Amadeus/Sabre/JV, para 25; case COMP/M.5154 CASCJV 
[2008], para 25. By all means, it is not advisable to prohibit any information exchange. The Commission 
has stated that the content and the nature of information transmitted is very crucial, while deciding 
whether there is an infringement. The Commission pays considerable attention to the role of 
information that is transmitted among undertakings and that can be clearly concluded through several 
judgments. Both in these rulings, and in other more theoretical approaches, many arguments exist, that 
enforce the idea of the antitrust effects of information exchange and the due consideration that must 
be paid on behalf of the competition authorities. The afore-mentioned observations do not signify that 
every sing exchange of information is per se prohibited. An analysis is absolutely necessary, in order to 
evaluate the effects of this exchange and detect any impediments to existing competition. With view to 
establishing a more transparent idea, exchange of information raises competition concerns, when it 
contains data concerning customers, sales or pricing. Once exchanged, information, such as market 
shares and terms of sales also have the ability to inhibit competition. Finally, it is most crucial that the 
parties to a JV do not exchange sensitive information, which goes beyond what is necessary for the 
accomplishment of the efficiency gains. For instance, an exchange of detailed data concerning certain 
persons is not considered to be necessary for the particular purpose of benchmarking and this may be 
regarded as an attempt to pursue a collusive effect. 
152 OECD roundtable on 'Competition Issues in JVs', OECD, DAFFE/CLP (2000) 33, 129. 
153 See case IV/M.1327 - NC/Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica [1998], paras 33-38. In this case, the activities 
of the new JV, called NCH, included the distribution of cable TV grids in France. The concentration 
included the transfer of 37% of shares to the JV, from Canal+ to BankAmerica and CDPQ, which were 
regarded as one parent undertaking by the Commission’s decision. The Commission considered 
possibility of coordination between the two parents in the relevant market. After a thorough and 
cumbersome investigation of the horizontal and vertical relationships between the parents and third 
businesses, the Commission reached the conclusion that, the one undertaking would become the 
inevitable collaborator of the other in the Spanish geographical market, because this was considered to 
be a reasonable economic conduct. This would lead to particular treatment, with exclusive distribution 
agreements and to vertical coordination between the parent companies. 
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First of all, the Commission defines the relevant market, where the parent 
undertakings operate. Furthermore, it assesses whether the coordination is 
appreciable and whether it gives the parent undertakings the possibility to eliminate 
competition for a great part of the products or services. It is worth to be mentioned 
that the element of significance should exist in any case, in order for the Commission 
to evaluate the case. What is more, the Commission investigates whether there is a 
casual link between the coordination of the parents and the formation of the JV. After 
the assessment of the afore-mentioned elements, the Commission proceeds to a 
further thorough investigation to find the motives of the parent undertakings. In this 
regard, it should be mentioned that each case has its own facts with its own 
particularity and consequently, the Commission takes them into serious consideration.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Thorough analysis of Joint Ventures, as alliances with unique features and multiple 
effects in the common market, could lead to certain conclusions in relation to 
competition law.  
 
First of all, it is established that, although JVs have been closely observed through the 
years, their exact definition does not exist. In fact, there can be different types of JVs, 
ranging from a loose association, created in order to achieve a single goal, to the 
formation of a long-lasting154 business establishment, which involves capital 
investment of unlimited duration. The attachment to the parent founding 
undertakings can also vary; in certain cases, the JV that is created is completely 
autonomous. Should the JV meet the criteria of the EUMR, it is regarded as 
concentrative and must be governed by the provisions of the Regulation. Furthermore, 
the creation of a concentrative Joint Venture can have both benefits and negative 
effects to competition. For this reason, the Commission usually conducts a benefit and 
cost analysis, with view to defining the impact that the JV has on the market, and 
decides whether the efficiency gains could possibly justify minor restriction of 
competition.  
 
What is more, the new economic entities that emerge in the single market necessitate 
without a doubt a structured coordination between the parent undertakings, so as to 
fulfill their economic activities. The economic result of the JV could not be 
accomplished without the cooperation between parent entities. However, there are 
some boundaries that must be imposed, in order to prevent spillover effects, which 
were previously examined extensively. The risk of having spillover effects is even 
greater, when the independent parent undertakings are operating in the same or 
                                                 
154 The Commission considers a five-year period as sufficient to have a lasting structural creation. 
Commission Notice on the Concept of Full-Function Joint Ventures, O.J.1998, § 15, EC, Commission 
Decision of 7 October 1996, British Gas Trading Ltd/Group 4 Utility Services, Case IV/M.791, O.J.1996, C 
374/8, § 10. 
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similar fields in the market. It is crucial that, the parent undertakings should not be 
allowed to exchange sensitive information that goes beyond the scope of the common 
activity purposes or let the same people work for the purposes of both the JV and the 
parent companies. It is very difficult to predict and prevent such kind of coordination 
between parent companies. However, the competition authorities must conduct a 
thorough economic investigation, in order to eliminate spillover effects and at the 
same time, preserve the economic benefits of the JVs.  
 
In fact, due to the approach that the EC has adopted, it is preferable to make 
undertakings accept certain commitments, instead of prohibiting the whole venture. 
The EC struggles to preserve the pro-competitive efficiencies that new economic 
entities create, in favor of the consumers and the common market. Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that the EC is obviously keen on the more economic approach theory 
(“economic balance sheet analysis)155 156 and tends to deal with each case separately 
(effects-based approach).157 Consequently, a careful observation of the so far 
approach of the EC is necessary, with view to comprehending its rationale and being 
capable of reaching certain conclusions.158  
                                                 
155 The approach of Article 2 par.4 of the Reg. 139/2004 is more economically realistic than the approach 
of Article 101 TFEU, according to the rulings of the Commission, Jones A., Sufrin B., “EU Competition 
Law. Text, cases and Materials”, 2014, p. 1242. 
156 At the EU level, this change towards a mainly economic evaluation of practices has been particularly 
important in the field of agreements, where originally formal analysis was more entrenched. Already in 
the 1970s, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) resorted to a substantial evaluation 
of agreements. For example, in Metro v Deutsche Grammophon," the appraisal of the beneficial 
economic effects of a distribution system prompted the ECJ to consider the agreement legitimate and, 
as such, outside the scope of Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities, 
notwithstanding some restrictive effects on pricing. In Nungesser v Commission, l Pronuptia v Schillgallis 
and De Limitis v Henninger Brau the ECJ reached the same conclusion.  
157 Blanco L.O., De Pablo A.L. (2012) “Expert economic evidence and effects-based assessments in 
competition law cases”, Merola M., Derenne J. (ed.), The Role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Competition Law Cases, Global Competition Law Center Annual Conference Series, p. 305 etc.  
158 Cook J., Kerse C. (2000) “EC Merger Control”, 3th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, p. 164. 
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